Those of a certain age recall Monty Woolley's Broadway and film performances in the Hart-Kaufman play, The Man Who Came to Dinner. A nationally renowned critic, while on a lecture tour, injures his hip on an icy staircase of a home where he had been invited for an evening's meal. For various reasons, he ends up staying far beyond the time allotted for his recovery. The critic has opinions, and, despite his curmudgeonly nature, completely rearranges the affairs of the household he occupies, at the same time keeping in constant telephone and telegraph contact with the world's artistic and intellectual luminaries. Curiously, one of those with whom he keeps in touch is a man named Dafoe. At the end of the play, the critic finally readies to leave when we hear him tumbling down the stairs on the way out, presumably to repeat his convalescence and, for better or worse, his influence on the affairs of the household.
If analogies are proffered as too exact, they become allegories. Before that happens I am almost done with this one. But my point is obvious. In the house of early eighteenth-century fiction, Ian Watt is the man who came to dinner. He has taken up a kind of semi-permanent residence. For some, his stay for the last half century has turned out to be amenable; for others, less so. Revisionist theorists of the novel, especially in the last decade, adduce a thousand and one reasons why Watt and his theories should depart posthaste, ranging from his failure to understand the inherent generic instability EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY FICTION, Volume 12, Number 2-3, January-April 2000 of the novel form, his misapprehension of the reading audience for fiction, his reluctance to acknowledge the existence of realist fiction much earlier and in other places than England, and his blindness to the insight that realism itself is little but another fiction, to his hesitancy to condemn realism as part of the corrupt Western bourgeois ethos. But no one, to my knowledge, has ever convincingly displaced Watt's notion of formal realism as a dominant characteristic of narrative during the early eighteenth century, particularly in England.
To gauge the sustained place of formal realism in most commentaries on the development of fiction in England, I reread several of the essays in The Cambridge Companion to the Eighteenth-Century Novel, edited by John Richetti. The volume has an introductory essay by Richetti and some generally theoretical speculations on the early novel by J. Paul Hunter, Maximillian Novak, Claude Rawson, and others. For whatever reason and in whatever contexts, these commentators agree that no matter what else one says about narrative in the early part of the century, the works produced are marked by features identified with formal realism: a concentration on daily life in particularized settings; a sense of information and immediacy; conventions of behaviour that would appear, at least to a reading audience, as part of its recognizable world. In Novak's fine essay, "Defoe as an Innovator of Fictional Form," he suggests that, despite arguments put forward about the novel by Michael McKeon and (in extreme form) Margaret Anne Doody that there is less new under the novel's sun than Watt imagined, the pressure to represent the circumstances of life in every detailed way imaginable, to experience narrative, as Defoe puts it, "with a new Feather in its Cap,"1 encouraged widespread experiments in realism.
Of course, the reaction to realist narrative material in the eighteenth century was not categorically positive. Pope and Swift were appalled by the pressures of realism in modern narrative. For the former, realism was little more than gossip; for the latter, little less than onanism. Rawson points out that Fielding saw the tendencies of realistic narration (at least in Richardson's fiction) as the "hothouse immediacies" of a kind of debased writing. In an even better phrase for the realist trompe l'oeil of fiction, Rawson calls the work of Defoe and Richardson "hoax without irony."2 He has in mind the illusionism of realist narrative, what James Joyce was later to call "genuine forgeries,"3 perhaps hinting at the word play in his famous dictum for the novelistic imagination, the forging, making, and counterfeiting that take place in the smithy of the realist's soul. But
Rawson (and probably Fielding and also probably Joyce ) recognized the illusionism of "unprocessed circumstance" as "one of the most powerful animating forces in the evolution of the novel."4 These forces have been with us ever since. All the issues surrounding realism are still ingrained in our collective imagination, from the vogue for docufiction in mid-century America to the experience around the world today of "Real TV," where cameras perched on the dashboards of police and emergency vehicles capture the drama and often the gore of car chases, road accidents, drug raids, wife beatings, heart attacks, and catastrophic weather.5 Realism is so permanent a part of the Western imagination that its recording devices now produce evidence culled from phone taps, wires, or, even more egregiously, hidden cameras that track the chicaneries of unscrupulous retailers or the local water-hole whereabouts of cheating husbands and wives. The Internet provides its own brand of supra-realism, where subscribers can enjoy a concentrated twenty-four-hour voyeuristic vigil in a woman's bedroom, marked by many moments of tedium and a few of titillation. I am not sure that the impulses here are entirely different from those exquisite intimacies so dear to Samuel Richardson in Pamela's closet or Clarissa's suite at Mrs Sinclair's.
As Watt recognized in his work on eighteenth-century fiction, the assumptions that govern realism as a narrative mode are based on habits of mind and culture that began to emerge forcefully in seventeenthcentury Europe: the psychology of individual apprehension, cognition, and conscience; the material urgency of contemporary experiences; the believability of represented events within the general laws of circumstantial probability; the sceptically driven curiosity surrounding the laws and phenomena of nature. It is not that such impulses in narrative never existed before the seventeenth century, but that they begin to dominate then, not only in many of the set narrative forms of the time-heroic and epicbut also in other narrative venues and forms-diaries, memoirs, journals, 3 James Joyce, Ulysses, ed. Hans Gabler (New York: Garland, 1984) , p. 518. References are to this edition.
4 Rawson, p. 121.
5 The fascination with weather in narrative can no doubt be traced to ancient epic and sacred texts, but it is a matter of interest that Defoe's first extended narrative work, The Storm (London, 1704), was an attempt to record the effects of and reaction to a disastrous series of weather conditions during 1703 in the British Isles.
criminal and religious confessions, and even news reporting. Why and how realism manifests in the larger forms of prose fiction in the early eighteenth century are Ian Watt's great subjects. As many commentators have tirelessly pointed out, one of the issues muddling the reception of Watt's work is the very word "novel." "Novel" was not a comfortable term for most of the writers Watt focuses upon. Defoe, Richardson, even Fielding went to extraordinary lengths to call their fictional narratives everything under the sun but novels. Novels were associated with romances, and that is precisely what the writers of prose narratives (those we now call novels) in England wished to avoid. The tendency in the early eighteenth century was to lump novels and romances together to the degree that they heightened some of the less believable circumstances of human life, whether the fantastic, the improbable, or the supremely emotional. Fielding, for example, knew what the issues were in fictional representation, and he knew that "Mrs. Novel" of The Author's Farce (Eliza Haywood) was operating mostly in the world of romance and not in the realm of fiction he would pioneer, which, no matter how strenuously and comically contrived in matters of plot, was still rational, observant, keen on the satiric possibilities of behaviour, and dominated by motives that are discernible in a quasi-realist world of class and professional interests.
One clear characteristic of formal realism is that it spends less and less time with features of narrative ascribable to miracles, to magic, to inexplicable occurrences, to idealizations of behaviour beyond the probable passions and indulgences of human beings in recognizable settings. Romance, on the other hand, is that mode in which probability is, at best, intermittent. Many of those in the last few decades who have responded to the notions of Watt, for whom probability or circumstantial realism was paramount in defining narrative forms of the early eighteenth century, argue that romance elements are indeed left in much of the fiction of the period. And of course these respondents are right. Paradigms of romancevictimage, forbearance, rescue-remain entrenched in realist fiction. But what is removed are those generic parts of romance that define causality and circumstance by forces inapplicable to the world of conventional experience, as if the twenty-four hours of each romance day are filled with special events answerable only to the powers that produce them. That is, in romance, laws of nature and culture are rewritten, sometimes suspended, in concert with the exigencies of peculiar plots and the intense motivations of romance characters-star-struck, doting, or drugged lovers, magical assistants, private enforcers, tyrannical overlords, oracles, witches, ghosts, alchemists.
For the reader ofromances to imagine that characters lead any life outside the improbable plots that engage them is difficult, if not impossible. Lovers in romances, for example, live life at such a pitch of emotional connection or emotional deprivation that the ordinary proves intolerable. If romance becomes fantastic and if characters bear odd morphic forms (and seem motivated by angelic or demonic forces), narrative action is even more disconnected from the reality of the twenty-four-hour day. How, after all, does pure good or pure evil function during off-hours? How would readers imagine the gnomes, trolls, witches, prophets, guardian angels, evil priests of romance performing daily chores: balancing account books? getting their teeth pulled? sleeping in of a morning? buying the ingredients for a salad? This has not changed over the years. Even the modern fantasies that go under the narrative name of action romance-comic book or filmcount on romance time rather than realist time. Can we imagine Obi Wan Kenobi and Jabba the Hutt waiting in line at the Department of Motor Vehicles? What do the evil acolytes or villain's helpers (often a kind of whole social order of myrmidons) do in a James Bond or Superman romance when they are not in liege service doing something awful to the world or to the hero? Do they go to the movies that make fun of them?
In the formal realism of what later came to be called the novel, readers can imagine a twenty-four-hour daily life cycle beyond the pages of the book, whether those hours are narrated or not. The projection of minutes into segments that grow into hours, days, weeks, and months is part of a sequential flow of time. Romance time, on the other hand, is idle, idyllic, or purely coincidental. It has little measure except as an expression of desire, desperation, power, obligation, or fate. Time is one of the ways Cervantes gets so much parodie play in Don Quixote out of the mixture of romance and realism. His romance-besotted hidalgo is forced to deal with the exigencies of realist time (the time it takes to eat or to pay the innkeeper) while Quixote's imaginative life is guided only by the intensity of romanticized expectations, obligations, and duties. Moreover, it is precisely the overabundance of coincidence as a product of time in romance (a compression of time into fatal moments) that Cervantes parodies in the absurdly narrated scene in the Sierra Morena mountains where several members of the same family-lost or separated for years-suddenly arrive at the same inn at the same time. Romance makes coincidence an expectation of its design because coincidence is really a betrayal of the seeming randomness of realist time; whereas coincidence in realism-even, say, in Moll Flanders's unlikely meeting with her mother and brother in Virginiamust bear some relation to a reader's sense of how coincidence might operate in any fuller random sequence of temporal events.
beyond the fiction of the eighteenth century, it is important to recognize that nothing so stark as a given literary period or a given literary form limits the realist impulse. As an impulse, realism is always available; what is at issue is its dominance within narrative actions. Spots of realism can (and do) even exist within largely unrealistic forms, and ancient ones at that. There is a moment in book 1 9 of the Odyssey when Penelope tries to coax a visitor (who is really Odysseus disguised as a beggar) into a believable enough rendition of his story for her to credit his claim to having seen Odysseus twenty years before in Crete on the way to the Trojan War. Striving for credibility, Odysseus "gave his falsehoods all the ring of truth."6
When Penelope decides to test these true lies-"Now, stranger, I think I'll test you, just to see if ... you actually entertained my husband as you say" (19:249-50; 397)-she makes no reference to the usual run of mythic mariner tales or to the coincidence-driven pirate romances that seem to course through Ithaca of that era, nor does she refer to the heroic propensities of the tales of nostoi that adorn the tongues of epic bards, nor to any one of the dozens of supernatural events that enter the narrative when the gods who control the action so dispose. Instead, she narrows the focus to the very particulars of Odysseus's clothing because that would have been the last formally real image she had of her husband before he What of the men who followed in his train?" "Ah good woman" Odysseus, the great master of subtlety, returned, "how hard it is to speak, after so much time apart ... why, some twenty years have passed since he left my house and put my land behind him. Even so, imagine the man as I portray him-I can see him now.
King Odysseus ... he was wearing a heavy woolen cape, sea-purple in double folds, with a golden brooch to clasp it, twin sheaths for the pins, on the face a work of art: a hound clenching a dappled fawn in its front paws, slashing it as it writhed. All marveled to see it, solid gold as it was, the hound slashing, throttling the fawn in its death-throes, hoofs flailing to break free. I noticed his glossy tunic too, clinging to his skin like the thin glistening skin of a dried onion, silky, soft, the glint of the sun itself.
Women galore would gaze on it with relish. (19:251-70; 397-98) The kind of eye for particulars described in this passage is precisely what makes narrative seem probable, steeped in detail, materially acute and culturally circumscribed (in this instance) by the very rudiments of the dressed body. In fact, it was passages like these that made the nineteenthcentury novelist-satirist Samuel Butler think the Odyssey written by a woman, one anachronistically schooled by the not-as-yet developed novelistic medium. Odysseus seems to know that he can stimulate Penelope's memory and imagination by reproducing the force of a moment, fashioning it through fashion. When James Joyce, almost three thousand years later, reimagined his own Odysseus as Leopold Bloom in Ulysses he recalled the Homeric realist's expert eye for clothing. Bloom imagined himself talking to an old flame, Josie Breen, and commenting on her "new hat of white velours with a surround of molefur that Mrs. Hayes advised you to buy because it was marked down to nineteen and eleven, a bit of wire and an old rag of velveteen." Bloom comments that "it didn't suit you one quarter as well as the other ducky little tammy toque with the bird of paradise wing in it that I admired on you" (p. 366).
in the Work, and some Turquois Stones; to the Vest, was a Girdle five or six Inches wide, after the Turkish Mode; and on both Ends where it join'd, or hook'd, was set with Diamonds ... but no-body knew that but myself.
The Turban, or Head-Dress, had a Pinacle on the top, but not above five Inches, with a Piece of loose Sarcenet hanging from it; and on the Front just over the Forehead, was a good Jewel, which I had added to it.8
For the garment-obsessed Samuel Richardson in Pamela, words are, in the form of hidden correspondence, at one point literally buried under clothes, and gentlemen make love by proffering garments before watching them slip from bodies. Pamela's master begins his seduction by giving her "a suit of my late lady's clothes, and half a dozen of her shifts, and six fine handkerchiefs, and three of her cambric aprons, and four Holland ones."9 And he begins his assault by watching Pamela undress, whenever the occasion permits-"I pulled off all my clothes to an under petticoat; and then hearing a rustling again in the closet, I said, 'Heaven protect us!'" (p.
95). Later, when the text lists double columns of proposals and responses, almost as a proffer letter, Mr B. includes the same items, including clothes andjewellery, in a mistress contract for Pamela once intended for a marriage contract for someone else. That the offerings stay the same even though the objects of courtship change is an irony not lost on the deeply imbued sense of realism in the narrative: "And I will give you the two diamond rings, and ear-rings, the solitaire and diamond necklace, and buckles that were brought to present to Miss Tomlins, if the treaty of marriage that was so near taking place between her and me had been brought to effect" (p.
229).
Richardson recognizes, as did Homer, that the beggar can transform into the hero (or heroine) by dressing up to play the part in a class-perfect manner. Pamela's clothes finally reward her, and Mr B. tells her to dress for a morning walk. "She put on fine linen, silk shoes, and fine white cotton stockings, a handsome quilted petticoat, a rich green Mantua silk gown and coat; a French necklace, and a laced cambric handkerchief, and clean gloves" so that, as Pamela herself phrases it, when she looked in her mirror she "was ready to think myself a gentlewoman" (p. 337).
Recognizable textures of life constitute a powerful realistic impulse. They touch on issues of believability and probability, which always come to the fore in consideration of the nature of a narrative work. What kinds of accounts do readers credit, and why? Again, no one should assume that credibility in narrative is an issue peculiar to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. But rarely does credibility or the realism that attends it stand alone as a narrative issue in earlier works. In one of Boccaccio's Decameron stories, the matter of narrative credibility gets enmeshed in an overlay of romance and realism that will also mark experiments in narrative from Cervantes' Don Quixote to Aphra Behn's Oroonoko. Boccaccio's story is one in which the indescribably lovely daughter of a Sultan passes through the hands of eight lovers in nearly as many different lands before she ends up with the original husband the Sultan intended for her. The sequence of events in this story is utterly improbable-it inscribes a kind of ronde or circle of illicit relations based on all the coincidental economies of romance. As readers, we accept the wildly improbable circumstances of the story because we assume the coincidental structure to be part of the story's structural point.
In an unexpected twist, though, the story itself introduces a problem that only realism can solve. When the sexually recycled daughter still hopes at story's end to pass herself off as a virgin bride, she must, with the help of a wily old counsellor, convince her father, the Sultan, of a false narrative, one parallel to the one that supposedly took place but of a completely different nature that will not put too great a strain on credulity. The counsellor therefore invents for the daughter a realistic story within the romance we have just read, a story that the Sultan will believe. There is at this moment in the narrative a reversal of programs, a new reading model based on a plausible, uncoincidental, perfectly reasonable recitation of events. The Sultan listens to a false story filled with facts, details, consistency, probability, verifiability, and, if need be, documents and testimonies. When the daughter retells the fabrication she has been told to tell with "instructions to the tiniest detail,"10 the Sultan comes around to another version of events, a believable version and a much more probable one than the contrived sexual adventures of the daughter. The counsellor verifies the new tale by techniques worthy of the courtroom:
"Her story corresponds in every detail with the account she has given me on many occasions" (pp. 146-47). He then proceeds with fake testimonials to the Sultan that do exactly what realism always does-break beyond the narrative time to assume a fuller day: "Were I to provide you with a full account of what they said to me on this particular subject, I could go on talking all day and all night without coming to the end of it." The realism ruse works, and the daughter gains her first intended husband: "And so, despite the fact that eight separate men had made love to her on thousands of different occasions, she entered his bed as a virgin and convinced him that it was really so" (p. 147).
The notion Boccaccio introduces here becomes one of the defining characteristics of realism as it develops in a systematic way in post-Renaissance narrative: the corroborative story that exists outside the story, the story to which narrators have (or pretend to have) access. Cervantes makes a great deal of such corroborative techniques in Don Quixote, and he employs one of realism's persistent tropes, the double-text story-texts within a story running side by side that confirm or provide the guise of authenticity to the stories at hand or even question moments in the presentation that seem dubious or improbable. By the 1720s, Daniel Defoe masters the corroborative technique in the realism of his time. His narratives are a virtual collection of verifying documents-journals, wills, contracts, ledger sheets, treaties, memoranda, secretarial notations, bills of lading-with a host of editors invented to organize it all. Defoe was very much a pioneer in the attempt to understand the narrative value of corroborative representation, and if one reads his remarks on fiction carefully, it is clear that he makes distinctions in his own mind (and expected those distinctions to be made by his readers) between the validity of fictions that read as if they are composed of genuine, verifiable documents and fictions that merely give flight to a narrator's fancy. He went so far in his defence of the Crusoe legend to argue in one of the continuation volumes that his story was true whether it happened or not, true, that is, to the possibility of having happened, and true to the level of applicable moral meaning that can be derived from an authenticfeeling record of events. After Robinson Crusoe had been attacked as a pure fabrication by Charles Gildon, Defoe picked up his pen as Crusoe (the very thing that Gildon accused him of in the first place) and turned the tables on those who identified the tale as make-believe. To do so, he fabricated a real Crusoe testifying or affirming on his own as he might do in a court proceeding.
I Robinson Crusoe, being at this Time in perfect and sound mind and memory, thanks be to God therefor, do hereby declare their objective is an invention scandalous in design, and false in fact; and do affirm that the story, though allegorical, is also historical; and that it is the beautiful representation of a life of unexampled misfortunes, and of a variety not to be met with in the world, sincerely adapted to and intended for the common good of mankind, and designed first, as it is now farther applied, to the most serious uses possible." If Defoe were presenting material in a way that counterfeited other forms of authentic writing, he would follow the expectations of those forms. What Defoe discovered was not the form out there we now comfortably know as the novel, but rather a host of ways to mimic material borrowed from the authentic and probable prose records of human experience. Much of the force of realism in the period that Watt and other critics of the novel focus upon in the early eighteenth century reflects the hunger for printed matter that stands in or substitutes for actual experience. So it is not just that the plots of narrative conform to realism, but that the print medium verifies the stuff and contents of life. The reading public early in the century was hungry for information about all things, and the kinds of narratives invented by Defoe and others proved one of the most flexible and entertaining ways to satisfy that hunger. For example, Defoe pauses in Moll Flanders at one point and advises anyone not interested in the detailed explanation of pickpocketing that he intends to provide in the pages that follow to skip that portion of the narrative and begin reading again further down line for the pure story. It is hard to imagine any reader taking that suggestion, and even harder to believe that Defoe thought any eighteenth-century reader would.
To look carefully at the kind of books written and sold in the age is to comprehend the driving interest within the publishing community to produce material that contains information about every conceivable aspect of daily life: vade mecums or "follow me" books, guides to religious practices, medical cures, legal services, estate husbandry, professional manuals, travelogues, maps, atlases, art and archaeology catalogues, military history, ordnance charts, battle tactics, trade practices, letter-writing, family advising, historical almanacs, diplomatic histories, secret histories, and pseudo-pornographic and or picaresque memoirs and autobiographies.12
There are testimonial advertisements for surgical and optical procedures, ruptures, venereal cures; detailed and poignant advertisements for missing persons; plans and schemes for recovering stolen goods; and advertisements in daily and weekly newspapers for lovers' trysts, for the public airing of private family disputes, for money-making schemes and projects (often called, much like the fiction of the age, "adventures"), for travel itineraries and tours.
Even the single-product advertising columns in the vastly expanded journalistic productions of the early eighteenth-century periodicals parallel, indeed help sustain, the material bases of formal realism. One need only look at the advertisements in Defoe's Review, Addison and Steele's Spectator, and Steele's Tatler to gain a sense of the way the print world verified or substantiated the obsessions and fascinations of everyday life that so fully captured the imagination of the reading, purchasing, and bartering public. There are over eleven thousand advertisements in these periodicals, many of them mini-narratives: apologies, defences, pleas for understand- If there are doubts about the potentially intrinsic connection of such advertisements to the substance of eighteenth-century fiction, one need read only a few parodie pages of Gulliver's Travels, which uses the language of advertising to abuse modern English culture in the land of the austere and materially bereft Houyhnhnms. Gulliver explains to his host horse that at The answer might well be the Review's "Real and truly Beautifying Cream" or, at least, its nineteenth-century equivalent: "Merely Gowland ... you cannot be better than well; or I should recommend Gowland, the constant use of Gowland, during the spring months. Mrs. Clay has been using it at my recommendation, and you see what it has done for her. You see how it has carried away her freckles."14
Here is another parody of an advertisement from the most renowned of twentieth-century encyclopedic realist narratives, Joyce's Ulysses, in which, as is the case for so much else in that novel, the commonplace transforms into the dimensions of the heroic. A laxative does epic wonderwork when a new "carminative" sings its own song as it acts to restore heroism, love, and nostos in the modern world.
It heals and soothes while you sleep, in case of trouble in breaking wind, assists in nature in the most formidable way, insuring instant relief in discharge of gases, keeping parts clean and free natural action, an initial outlay of 7/6 making a new man of you and life worth living. Ladies find Wonderworker especially useful, a pleasant surprise when they note delightful result like a cool drink of fresh spring water on a sultry summer's day. Recommend it to your lady and gentlemen friends, lasts a lifetime. Insert long round end Wonderworker, (p. 593) Only formal realism (leavened by irony) can bring a reader to the point where product advertisements become paradigms for Homeric plots. Joyce understands more thoroughly than any writer that the shape of realist narration in the novel is at base factual, and that the substance of action derives from substantive things. At another point in Ulysses, the shape of narration-its absolute formal realism-sounds like a product promotion for the elixir of life. Leopold Bloom boils water in his flat and Joyce's readers encounter two pages of packed print on the Dublin water supply system that makes the most universal form in nature, water, into a fully constituted material hero of an island epic. The text ponders what Bloom admires in water:
14 Jane Austen, Persuasion, ed. Patricia Meyer Spacks (New York: Norton, 1995), p. 96.
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Its universality: its democratic equality and constancy to its nature in seeking its own level: its vastness in the ocean of Mercator's projection: its unplumbed profundity ... its capacity to dissolve and hold in solution all soluble substances including millions of tons of the most precious metals: its slow erosions of peninsulas and islands, its persistent formation of homothetic islands, peninsulas and downwardtending promontories: its alluvial deposits: its weight and volume and density, (p. 549) Ian Watt was among the first to ask when and where prose fiction turned in the direction of such substantial representation, and he did well to begin to answer by looking at the accumulation of details that characterizes another famous island narrative, Defoe's Robinson Crusoe, seeing the formal realism of that work as the individual's apprehension of the stuff of his universe. But Watt's greater contribution remains his recognition that formal realism begins not so much in the actual work-horse novels of the early eighteenth century as in the general attitude towards representation developing throughout the seventeenth century in Europe and England. One can recede even further back into the late sixteenth century and the protorealist experimental essay invented by Michel de Montaigne. The domestic habit of Montaigne's mind, his attention to the bizarre details that make life, if not livable, at least recordable, the resistance to landscapes that are not, ultimately, human, and the will to break down those barriers that exist between the pictures of experience the mind conjures and the contingencies that the various bodies making up the human race endure all make Montaigne an important forebear of realism. "In my opinion," he writes, "the most ordinary things, the most commonplace and bestknown can constitute, if we know how to present them in the right light, the greatest of Nature's miracles and the most amazing examples, notably on the subject of human actions."15 Or: "Anything we do reveals us. That same soul of Caesar's which displayed itself in ordering and arranging the battle of Pharsalia is also displayed when arranging his idle and amorous affrays. You judge a horse not only by seeing its paces on a race-track but by seeing it walk-indeed, by seeing it in its stable" ("On Democritus and Heraclitus," p. 338).
The reduction of scale and the focus upon the domestic here has an analogue, perhaps, in Milton's reconstruction of appropriate heroic and epic narrative scale for the human predicaments represented in the Garden of Eden of Paradise Lost. In the prologue to book 9, Milton sought an "answerable style" to rid the epic of its classical conventions and romance formulas and introduce into Paradise the more simply framed domestic squabbles of a married couple. The idea of domestic space for fiction is still a fresh one for James Joyce in the twentieth century (though perhaps he exaggerates its freshness). In an early essay, "Drama and Life," Joyce narrows the realist's scope in a manner very similar to both Montaigne and Milton several hundred years before him.
Epic savagery is rendered impossible by vigilant policing, chivalry has been killed by the fashion oracles of the boulevards. There is no clank of mail, no halo about gallantry, no hat-sweeping, no roystering! The traditions of romance are upheld only in Bohemia. Still I think out of the dreary sameness of existence, a measure of dramatic life may be drawn. Even the most commonplace, the deadest among the living, may play a part in a great drama. It is a sinful foolishness to sigh back for the good old times, to feed the hunger of us with the cold stones they afford.
Life we must accept as we see it before our eyes, men and women as we meet them in the real world, not as we apprehend them in the world of faery. The great human comedy in which each has share, gives limitless scope to the true artist, today as yesterday and as in years gone.16
Each character has a share in the comedy we call human, and small narrative spaces can open to contain multitudes, especially when narrative refocuses subject matter from the cosmic world to the mind, actions, motives, and experiences of individuals. To turn again to Montaigne, his thoughts on how people think and act relate powerfully to the kind of internal thought processes and associational connections that Watt later links to formal realism in the novel. In "On the Power of the Imagination," Montaigne analyses the things individuals believe and the stories they tell under the influence of suggestion, fear, superstition, and desire. The idea behind this essay (and many others in Montaigne) is that much that falls under the realm of the marvellous and fabulous is psychosomatic or delusional. All things are of interest to Montaigne if he can explain the processes that produce them. Montaigne introduces a word in his analysis that I think crucial. The word is "conscience." By that word he means the activities that take place in the mind of a subject. Milton uses the word in the same way in Paradise Lost, and I think one of the key shifts in sensibility that Watt addressed in his discussion of realism is the manner in which the notion of conscience becomes part of narrative knowledge. Benengeli finally says that Quixote recanted of the Cave of Montesinos story on his deathbed, but, of course, Quixote had revealed the nature of his belief on a different level earlier, when he was willing to adjust his conscience in crediting Sancho's absurd rendition of a journey on a flying horse provided Sancho would back off on publicly contesting Quixote's own Montesinos fabrication. There is an inspired moment of formal realism in the text, a moment where the dialogue and the exigencies of plot reflect the motives, sensibilities, desires, and insecurities of the protagonists: "Sancho, if you want me to believe what you saw in the sky, I wish you to accept my account of what I saw in the Cave of Montesinos. I say no more." (p. 735). In the world of realism, belief in romance becomes a negotiation.
The idea in the seventeenth century that narrative negotiates perception manifests itself at an earlier moment in Don Quixote when the knight attempts to get some travelling merchants to testify to his projected DuIcinea's beauty even if they have never laid eyes on her. Their reply reveals the realist imagination superseding the romantic one: "we would not burden our consciences by testifying to something that we have never seen or heard" (p. 51). In the course of the seventeenth century, conscience replaces fame and glory as a point of literary reference. For Milton, "conscience" wakes Satan's "bitter memory / Of what he was, what is, and what must be" (Paradise Lost, book 4, . Conscience is akin to individual consciousness, the power of the mind to reconstitute images of past, to relive the present, and to project the future. When Ian Watt draws on seventeenth-century epistemology to explain the way memory, language, and associations form the unique experiences of individuals as they begin to be represented in fiction, he is not far from rearticulating Milton's point about the answerable style of narrative based on the exigencies of human knowledge or conscience. Milton understood in book 9 of Paradise Lost that he was expanding the bounds of genre by refocusing and miniaturizing the realm of narrative to the choosing mind.
Even before Milton's great epic-an epic of parallel worlds, really, the world of cosmic space and the world of the domestic bower-the tension 18 Cervantes, Don Quixote, trans. J. M. Cohen (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1950 ), p. 624. in the century about the nature of represented action can be seen in a watershed document of mid-seventeenth-century narrative criticism, Charles Davenant's "Preface" to Gondibert, where Davenant marked the distinction between the literature of conscience and the literature of fame. He tried to stem the political fervour of the Puritan "saints" by re-establishing older literary values based on heroic reputation, honour, and glory-values perpetuated in another venue satirically by Don Quixote as part of his dementia. Davenant understood that a change in the social structure of power can effect a change in the desires of the reading public.
The background to Davenant's remarks, of course, is the Parliamentary Revolution in England led by radical Protestants, whom Davenant associates with a new kind of literature and a new kind of belief system invading (and infecting) the world of polemical and commercial print. Davenant marks (without comprehending the full effect of what he is saying for later ages) a shift of taste from the aristocratic forms of literature to the more expansively based texts of "conscience" (including autobiographical and biographical forms of prose fiction) that would eventually constitute the experimental basis of narrative forms in the 1690s and early 1700s. The passage is long, but worth citing.
Those that write by the command of Conscience, thinking themselves able to instruct others, and consequently oblig'd to it, grow commonly the most volu-
